However, this is not necessarily true. Anselm is speaking about God as ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’, whereas Gaunilo is talking about a lost island and Plantinga pointed out that we can always think of a greater island (eg. one which is bigger, has more trees etc.). An island cannot have an ‘intrinsic maximum’.
Necessary existence is part of the concept of God whereas it is not part of the concept of the greatest conceivable lost island. Therefore, there is no contradiction in saying the island does not exist BUT there is a contradiction in saying God does not exist as it is equivalent of saying that ‘an existing God does not exist.’
Replies to Kant’s criticism
Necessary existence is a property of an inability to be generated or made corrupt
Stephen Davis argued that existence is a great making quality since the existence of money in reality rather than just the concept of money in my mind, permits me to purchase real items in the real world.
Replies to Frege’s criticism
Necessary existence is a property of an inability to be generated or made corrupt
Stephen Davis argued that existence is a great making quality since the existence of money in reality rather than just the concept of money in my mind, permits me to purchase real items in the real world.
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The ontological argument – Page 4
Gaunilo
Kant
Gaunilo
Gaunilo attacked the Anselm form of the ontological argument
Replacing the word ‘God’ with ‘the greatest conceivable lost island’ led to an argument which had the same form as Anselm’s, with true premises, and yet which leads to a false conclusion:
I can conceive of a ‘lost island’ that than which no greater island can be thought
Such an island must possess all greatness
It is greater to exist in reality than just in the mind
Therefore the ‘lost island’ must exist in reality
Kant
Kant attacked Descartes form of the ontological argument, but it also applies to Anselm’s form.
Kant challenged Descartes view that God’s existence was a necessary predicate. He said:
‘Existence is not a real predicate.’ It does not add anything to the concept.
More recently, A similar criticism centres around first and second order predicates. The former tell us about the nature of something eg. ‘the cat is black’. The latter tell us about concepts eg. ‘there are lots of cats’.
It is argued that Anselm and Descartes wrongly defined existence as a first order predicate when it really is a second-order concept. Existence is the property of a concept not of an object. Hence the affirmation of existence is nothing more than the denial of the number zero. Existence is not something that can be added to or subtracted from something.
We do not add anything when we declare that it ‘is’. In the sentence ‘God exists’, the subject is really ‘the concept of God’ and the predicate ‘exists’ means that ‘the concept of God applies to something.’ Existence is not a property.
The real contains no more than the merely possible, so a concept is not made more perfect (or greater) by adding reality.
Another criticism by Kant attacked Descartes form of the ontological argument. It concerned the rejection of both subject and predicate:
If you have a triangle, then you must have three angles.
But there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle with its three angles.
If you do not have a triangle, then you don’t have three angles.
Likewise, if there is no God, then there is no being with necessary existence.
If God exists he will have necessary existence, but it is not a contradiction to say that such a concept does not have an actuality.
Frege
Frege attacked both Anselm’s and Descartes forms of the argument
There are ‘first’ and ‘second-order’ predicates.
The former tell us about the nature of something eg. ‘the cat is black’.
The latter tell us about concepts eg. ‘there are lots of cats’.
Frege argued that Anselm and Descartes wrongly defined existence as a first order predicate when it really is a second-order concept. Existence is the property of a concept not of an object. Hence the affirmation of existence is nothing more than the denial of the number zero. Existence is not something that can be added to or subtracted from something.
We do not add anything when we declare that it ‘is’. In the sentence ‘God exists’, the subject is really ‘the concept of God’ and the predicate ‘exists’ means that ‘the concept of God applies to something.’ Existence is not a property.